Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games∗

@inproceedings{Jehiel2001GradualismIB,
  title={Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games∗},
  author={Philippe Jehiel},
  year={2001}
}
We model bargaining situations in which parties have the option to terminate the negotiation, resulting in a termination outcome that depends on the offers made in the negotiation phase. The key features of the model are that 1) making a concession in the negotiation phase increases the other party’s termination option payoff and 2) the termination outcome induces an efficiency loss as compared with a negotiated agreement. The main Þnding is that the mere threat of termination forces… CONTINUE READING
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