Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games∗

  title={Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games∗},
  author={Philippe Jehiel},
We model bargaining situations in which parties have the option to terminate the negotiation, resulting in a termination outcome that depends on the offers made in the negotiation phase. The key features of the model are that 1) making a concession in the negotiation phase increases the other party’s termination option payoff and 2) the termination outcome induces an efficiency loss as compared with a negotiated agreement. The main Þnding is that the mere threat of termination forces… CONTINUE READING
Highly Cited
This paper has 78 citations. REVIEW CITATIONS

1 Figure or Table



Citations per Year

79 Citations

Semantic Scholar estimates that this publication has 79 citations based on the available data.

See our FAQ for additional information.