Government subsidies to private spending on public goods

  title={Government subsidies to private spending on public goods},
  author={Russell D. Roberts},
  journal={Public Choice},
  • R. Roberts
  • Published 1 September 1992
  • Economics
  • Public Choice
This paper examines how the size of an efficient subsidy varies with the amount of free-riding and the presence of distorting taxation. Ironically, the existence of free-riding, where some individuals make no voluntary contribution at all, reduces the size of an efficient subsidy and makes a subsidy more attractive compared to direct taxation. For the gain to be significant, the number of donors must be extremely few in number. Even when the gains from a subsidy relative to direct taxation are… 
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