Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods

@article{Besley2001GovernmentVP,
  title={Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods},
  author={Timothy J. Besley and Maitreesh Ghatak},
  journal={IO: Regulation},
  year={2001}
}
There has been a dramatic change in the division of responsibility between the state and the private sector for the delivery of public goods and services in recent years with an increasing trend towards contracting out to the private sector and ‘public-private partnerships’. This Paper analyses how ownership matters in public good provision. We show that if contracts are incomplete then the ownership of a public good should lie with a party that values the benefits generated by it relatively… Expand
Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: The Role of Bargaining Frictions
The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public good. Who should be the owner of the public project? In an incomplete contracting model in which exExpand
Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information
  • P. Schmitz
  • Economics
  • Journal of Public Economics
  • 2021
Abstract Consider two parties who can make non-contractible investments in the provision of a public good. Who should own the physical assets needed to provide the public good? In the literature itExpand
Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships
  • O. Hart
  • Political Science, Business
  • 2002
The question of what should determine the boundaries between public and private firms in an advanced capitalist economy is a highly topical one. In this paper I discuss some recent theoreticalExpand
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs
A non-governmental organization (NGO) can make a non-contractible investment to provide a public good. Only ownership can be specified ex ante, so ex post efficiency requires reaching an agreementExpand
Incomplete Contracts and Optimal Ownership of Public Goods
The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public good. In an incomplete contracting framework, Besley and Ghatak (2001) have argued that the party whoExpand
Public versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks
The government wants a certain good or service to be provided. Should the required assets be publicly or privately owned or should a partnership be formed? Building on the incomplete contractingExpand
Maintenance Costs, Outside Options and Optimal Ownership of a Public Good
Abstract There has been much attention recently to public-private partnerships and the involvement of NGOs in public good provision. This paper re-examines the effect of ownership of a public good onExpand
Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships
The question of what should determine the boundaries between public and private firms in an advanced capitalist economy is a highly topical one. In this paper I will try to summarize some recentExpand
Reputation and Ownership of Public Goods
This paper analyzes the effect of reputation on ownership of public goods in the Besley and Ghatak (2001) model. We show that in the dynamic setup the optimal ownership depends not only on theExpand
Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation
Abstract How should ownership rights be allocated in public-good settings? We report data from a laboratory experiment with 480 participants that was designed to test a public-good version of theExpand
...
1
2
3
4
5
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 36 REFERENCES
State Versus Private Ownership
Private ownership should generally be preferred to public ownership when the incentives to innovate and to contain costs must be strong. In essence, this is the case for capitalism over socialism,Expand
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Our theory of costly contracts emphasizes that contractual rights can be of two types: specific rights and residual rights. When it is costly to list all specific rights over assets in the contract,Expand
Power in a Theory of the Firm
Transactions take place in the firm rather than in the market because the firm offers agents" who make specific investments power. Past literature emphasizes the allocation of ownership as the"Expand
Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm
This paper studies the Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) "property rights" approach to the theory of the firm under alternating-offers bargaining. When managers can pursue other occupations while negotiatingExpand
Noncooperative Bargaining, Hostages, and Optimal Asset Ownership
This paper re-examines the effect of asset ownership on investment decisions for a joint relationship in the absence of contracts on investment levels. It obtains some results which contradictExpand
Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments
We consider the effect of a renegotiable exclusive contract restricting a buyer to purchase from only one seller on the levels of noncontractible investments undertaken in their relationship.Expand
Hospital Ownership and Public Medical Spending
The hospital market is served by firms that are private for-profit, private not-for-profit, and government-owned and operated. I use a plausibly exogenous change in hospital financing that wasExpand
The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons
When should a government provide a service inhouse and when should it contract out provision? We develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost.Expand
When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently
H.R. Bowen showed that if voters have equal tax shares and if marginal rates of substitution are symmetrically distributed, then majority voting leads to efficient provision of public goods. TheseExpand
Decentralization, Externalities, and Efficiency
In the competitive model, externalities lead to inefficiencies, and inefficiencies increase with the size of externalities. However, as argued by Coase, these problems may be mitigated in aExpand
...
1
2
3
4
...