Governing the Global Commons with Local Institutions

  title={Governing the Global Commons with Local Institutions},
  author={Todd J. Bodnar and Marcel Salath{\'e}},
  journal={PLoS ONE},
Most problems faced by modern human society have two characteristics in common - they are tragedy-of-the-commons type of problems, and they are global problems. Tragedy-of-the-commons type of problems are those where a commonly shared resource is overexploited by free riders at the expense of everyone sharing the resource. The exploitation of global resources such as clean air and water, political stability and peace, etc. underlies many of the most pressing human problems. Punishment of free… 

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