Governance with Poor Investor Protection : Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in Italy

@inproceedings{Volpin2001GovernanceWP,
  title={Governance with Poor Investor Protection : Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in Italy},
  author={Paolo F. Volpin},
  year={2001}
}
This paper studies the determinants of executive turnover and firm valuation as a function of ownership and control structure in Italy, a country that features low legal protection for investors, firms with controlling shareholders and pyramidal groups. The results show that firms where the largest shareholders act as top executives, have a firm lock on control and own less than 50 percent of the firm’s cash-flow rights exhibit poor governance, as measured by a lower sensitivity of turnover to… CONTINUE READING
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