Governance and Prison Gangs

@article{Skarbek2011GovernanceAP,
  title={Governance and Prison Gangs},
  author={David B. Skarbek},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  year={2011},
  volume={105},
  pages={702 - 716}
}
  • David B. Skarbek
  • Published 18 October 2011
  • Business
  • American Political Science Review
How can people who lack access to effective government institutions establish property rights and facilitate exchange? The illegal narcotics trade in Los Angeles has flourished despite its inability to rely on state-based formal institutions of governance. An alternative system of governance has emerged from an unexpected source—behind bars. The Mexican Mafia prison gang can extort drug dealers on the street because they wield substantial control over inmates in the county jail system and… 
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