Corpus ID: 212626140

Gods, Games, and the Socioecological Landscape

  title={Gods, Games, and the Socioecological Landscape},
  author={Benjamin Grant Purzycki},
Many have suggested that religious beliefs and practices can be adaptive inasmuch as they optimally resolve or reduce the costs of general social dilemmas [5, 16]. Some have focused on modelling specific religious systems by examining payoffs ranging from ritualized management of the slaughter of competing livestock and outgroup conflict in Papua New Guinea [13] to the spiritually sanctioned field burning that yields greater returns in the form of edible monitor lizards in Australia [2]. Others… Expand

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