Global Games and Ambiguous Information: An Experimental Study

  title={Global Games and Ambiguous Information: An Experimental Study},
  author={Toshiji Kawagoe and Takashi Ui},
This paper considers a global game with ambiguity-averse players, where the variance of noise terms in private signals may be unknown, and it presents a laboratory experiment to test comparative statics results with respect to information quality. Suppose that one of the actions is a safe action yielding a constant payoff and it is a risk dominant action. Then, low quality of information makes less players choose the safe action, whereas ambiguous quality of information makes more players… CONTINUE READING

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