Gettier and the method of explication: a 60 year old solution to a 50 year old problem

  title={Gettier and the method of explication: a 60 year old solution to a 50 year old problem},
  author={Erik J. Olsson},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  • E. Olsson
  • Published 2015
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophical Studies
I challenge a cornerstone of the Gettier debate: that a proposed analysis of the concept of knowledge is inadequate unless it entails that people don’t know in Gettier cases. I do so from the perspective of Carnap’s methodology of explication. It turns out that the Gettier problem per se is not a fatal problem for any account of knowledge, thus understood. It all depends on how the account fares regarding other putative counter examples and the further Carnapian desiderata of exactness… 
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