Gettier Cases without False Lemmas?

  title={Gettier Cases without False Lemmas?},
  author={Michael E. Levin},
  • M. Levin
  • Published 5 July 2006
  • Philosophy
  • Erkenntnis
Examples cited by Feldman, Lehrer and others of true beliefs that are justified, but not by false lemmas, turn out under scrutiny to involve false lemmas after all. In each case there is an EG inference whose conclusion is unwarranted unless its base instance is false. A shift to non-deductive justification does not avert the difficulty. The relation of this result to non-inferential Gettier cases is suggested. 


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