Geodetic graphs of diameter two

  title={Geodetic graphs of diameter two},
  author={Aart Blokhuis and Andries E. Brouwer},
  journal={Geometriae Dedicata},
We survey what is known on geodetic graphs of diameter two and discuss the implications of a new strong necessary condition for the existence of such graphs. 
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