Generic difference of expected vote share and probability of victory maximization in simple plurality elections with probabilistic voters

@article{Patty2007GenericDO,
  title={Generic difference of expected vote share and probability of victory maximization in simple plurality elections with probabilistic voters},
  author={John W. Patty},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={2007},
  volume={29},
  pages={149-173}
}
In this paper I examine single member, simple plurality elections with n ≥ 3 probabilistic voters and show that the maximization of expected vote share and maximization of probability of victory are “generically different” in a specific sense. More specifically, I first describe finit shyness(Anderson and Zame (2000)), a notion of genericity for infinite dimensional spaces. Using this notion, I show that, for any policy x∗ in the interior of the policy space and any candidatej, the set ofn… CONTINUE READING
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