Generic catastrophic poverty when selfish investors exploit a degradable common resource

  title={Generic catastrophic poverty when selfish investors exploit a degradable common resource},
  author={Claudius Gros},
  journal={Royal Society Open Science},
  • C. Gros
  • Published 17 August 2022
  • Economics
  • Royal Society Open Science
The productivity of a common pool of resources may degrade when overly exploited by a number of selfish investors, a situation known as the tragedy of the commons. Without regulations, agents optimize the size of their individual investments into the commons by balancing incurring costs with the returns received. The resulting Nash equilibrium involves a self-consistency loop between individual investment decisions and the state of the commons. As a consequence, several non-trivial properties… 

Figures and Tables from this paper

Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources.

Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a feedback-evolving game

A coevolutionary model where beside the payoff-driven competition of cooperator and defector players the level of a renewable resource depends sensitively on the fraction of cooperators and the total consumption of all players is considered.

The Tragedy of the Commons: Property Rights and Markets as Solutions to Resource and Environmental Problems

In one way or another, all environmental and natural resource problems associated with overexploitation or under provision of public goods, arise from incompletely defined and enforced property

The Durability of Public Goods Changes the Dynamics and Nature of Social Dilemmas

The consequences of relaxing this assumption, allowing pay-offs to depend on both current and past numbers of cooperators, are examined, and an enlarged view of social cheats is challenged.

Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’

It is shown, through alternating rounds of public goods and indirect reciprocity games, that the need to maintain reputation for indirect reciprocities maintains contributions to the public good at an unexpectedly high level, but if rounds of indirect reciprocation are not expected, then contributions toThe public good drop quickly to zero.

Risk of collective failure provides an escape from the tragedy of the commons

It is found that decisions within small groups under high risk and stringent requirements to success significantly raise the chances of coordinating actions and escaping the tragedy of the commons.

Public goods in relation to competition, cooperation, and spite

  • S. Levin
  • Political Science
    Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
  • 2014
The solution to problems of the commons is in “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon,” and hence in how groups of individuals form and how they arrive at decisions that ultimately benefit all.

Retrospectives: Tragedy of the Commons after 50 Years

Garrett Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) has been incredibly influential generally and within economics, and it remains important despite some historical and conceptual flaws. Hardin

An oscillating tragedy of the commons in replicator dynamics with game-environment feedback

A unified approach to analyze and understand the coupled evolution of strategies and the environment is proposed, identifying an oscillatory tragedy of the commons in which the system cycles between deplete and replete environments and cooperation and defection behavior states and incentivizing cooperation when others defect in the depleted state is found.

News Feature: Can humankind escape the tragedy of the commons?

  • S. Battersby
  • Economics
    Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
  • 2017
Common resources, such as fisheries, forests, and even the air are threatened by selfish individuals and nations taking what they can, even though they know the resource will be wiped out if everyone does the same.