Generals, Dictators, and Kings

  title={Generals, Dictators, and Kings},
  author={Hanne Fjelde},
  journal={Conflict Management and Peace Science},
  pages={195 - 218}
  • H. Fjelde
  • Published 1 July 2010
  • Political Science
  • Conflict Management and Peace Science
Recent years have seen a surge of literature examining how political institutions influence the risk of civil conflict. A comparatively neglected aspect of this debate has been the heterogeneous impact of different forms of authoritarianism. In this article, I theoretically and empirically unpack the authoritarian regime category. I argue that authoritarian regimes differ both in their capacity to forcefully control opposition and in their ability to co-opt their rivals through offers of power… 

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