Generalized matchings for preferences represented by simplest semiorder: Stability and pareto optimality

@article{Kiselgof2014GeneralizedMF,
  title={Generalized matchings for preferences represented by simplest semiorder: Stability and pareto optimality},
  author={S. G. Kisel’gof},
  journal={Automation and Remote Control},
  year={2014},
  volume={75},
  pages={1069-1077}
}
We consider an extension of the classical model of generalized Gale-Shapley matchings. The model describes a two-sided market: on one side, universities each of which has a restriction on the number of enrolled students; on the other side, applicants each of which can get a single place in the university. Both applicants and universities have preferences with respect to the desired distribution. We assume that each applicant constructs a linear order on the set of desired universities, and each… CONTINUE READING