Generalising the probabilistic semantics of conditionals

  title={Generalising the probabilistic semantics of conditionals},
  author={Anthony Appiah},
  journal={Journal of Philosophical Logic},
  • Anthony Appiah
  • Published 1 November 1984
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Journal of Philosophical Logic
ConclusionIf assertibility rules are to be important in semantic theory, hypotheses such as this one will need to beiinvestigated. And Slote's observation (see note 12) that what matters for assertibility is not belief but knowledge will turn out to have powerful consequences.Adams' rule is the first well understood assertibility rule in philosophical semantics. I think we should be led by its successes to look for more. In this paper, I have built on his assertibility rule and offered two more… Expand
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