Generalised Cycling Attacks on RSA and Strong RSA Primes

  title={Generalised Cycling Attacks on RSA and Strong RSA Primes},
  author={Marc Gysin and J. Seberry},
Given an RSA modulus n, a ciphertext c and the encryption exponent e, one can construct the sequence x0 = c mod n, xi+1 = xie mod n; i = 0, 1,... until gcd(xi+1 - x0, n) ≠ 1 or i or i > B, B a given boundary. If i ≤ B, there are two cases. Case 1: gcd(xi+1 -x0, n) = n. In this case xi = m and the secret message m can be recovered. Case 2: 1 ≠ gcd(xi+1 - x0; n) ≠ n. In this case, the RSA modulus n can be factorised. If i ≤ B, then Case 2 is much more likely to occur than Case 1. This attack is… Expand
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