Gender Identity and Relative Income within Households

  title={Gender Identity and Relative Income within Households},
  author={Marianne Bertrand and Emir Kamenica and Jessica Pan},
  journal={Development Economics: Women},
We examine causes and consequences of relative income within households. We show the distribution of the share of income earned by the wife exhibits a sharp drop to the right of 1/2, where the wife's income exceeds the husbands income. We argue that this pattern is best explained by gender identity norms, which induce an aversion to a situation where the wife earns more than her husband. We present evidence that this aversion also impacts marriage formation, the wife's labor force participation… 

Gender identity and relative income within households: Evidence from Canada

Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015) show that among married couples in the US, the distribution of the share of the household income earned by the wife exhibits a sharp drop just to the right of 50%.

Gender Identity and Relative Income within Households: Evidence from China

How does conforming to traditional gender roles affect women’s labour outcomes? To investigate this question, we use the discontinuity test and fixed effect regression with the time lag to measure

Gender identity and relative income within household: Evidence from China

How does conforming to traditional gender roles affect women’s labour outcomes? To investigate this question, we use the discontinuity test and fixed effect regression with the time lag to measure

Women’s pre-marriage income and the division of household labour

ABSTRACT This study investigates the effects of women’s economic resources on the division of household labour by employing pre-marriage income as a proxy for resources, rather than post-marriage


By how much do traditional gender norms in marriage constrain aggregate output? Married women are traditionally expected to stay home and take care of the household. This gender role reduces married

What Women Want: Family Formation and Labor Market Responses to Marriage Incentives

Family structure in the United States has shifted substantially over the last three decades, yet the causes and implications of these changes for the well-being of family members remains unclear.

Career Women and the Durability of Marriage ∗

We study the relationship between divorce rates and female labor force attachment in the US. Recent cross-sectional evidence from US states displays a robust negative correlation between divorce and

Money, Work, and Marital Stability

Despite a large literature investigating how spouses’ earnings and division of labor relate to their risk of divorce, findings remain mixed and conclusions elusive. Core unresolved questions are (1)

The Gender Cliff in the Relative Contribution to the Household Income: Insights from Modelling Marriage Markets in 27 European Countries

  • A. GrowJ. Van Bavel
  • Economics
    European journal of population = Revue europeenne de demographie
  • 2020
A simulation approach is used to model marriage markets and results show that a cliff can emerge from inequalities in men's and women’s average incomes, even if they do not attach special meaning to a situation in which a wife earns more than her husband.

Social norms and gender discrimination in the labor market: An agent-based exercise

The incorporation of women into the labor market remains a challenge for most countries; likewise, gender gaps are observed in indicators such as employment, unemployment and participation. In this



Income dynamics in couples and the dissolution of marriage and cohabitation

It is found that the stabilizing effects of income equality are more pronounced early in the marriage and that income equality also reduces the dissolution risk for same-sex couples.

Does divorce risk depend on spouses´ relative income? A register-based study of first marriages in Sweden in 1981–1998

The relationship between increasing women’s earnings and rising divorce rates frequently has been explained by the so-called independence effect: If a wife enjoys a higher earning than her husband

The joint effects of marriage partners’ socioeconomic positions on the risk of divorce

Women who were employed or were homemakers, and who had employed husbands, had comparatively stable marriages; couples in which the husband, the wife, or both partners were unemployed had an elevated risk of divorce.

When Does Gender Trump Money? Bargaining and Time in Household Work1

Using data from Australia and the United States, the authors explore the effect of spouses’ contribution to family income on how housework is divided. Consistent with exchange‐bargaining theory,

Economic Dependence, Gender, and the Division of Labor in the Home: A Replication and Extension

The fundamental question in the study of the gendered division of household labor has come to be why, in the face of dramatic changes in women's employment and earnings, housework remains “women's

The Effect of Male Wage Inequality on Female Age at First Marriage

A model in which women search for husbands characterized by their wages predicts increasing within-group male wage inequality, raises the expected value of continued marital search, and so lowers

Marriage Meets the Joneses: Relative Income, Identity, and Marital Status

An identity model is proposed to explain the effect of relative income on marriage, which shows that the ratio between a man's income and a local reference group median is a strong predictor of marital status, but only for low-income men.

“Doing” Gender in Context: Household Bargaining and Risk of Divorce in Germany and the United States1

  • L. Cooke
  • Sociology, Economics
    American Journal of Sociology
  • 2006
Gender relations remain embedded in their sociopolitical context. Compared here using event‐history analysis is how household divisions of paid and unpaid labor affect marital stability in the former

Male Incarceration, the Marriage Market, and Female Outcomes

This paper studies how rising male incarceration has affected women through its effect on the marriage market. Variation in marriage-market shocks arising from incarceration is isolated using two

A Theory of Marriage: Part I

  • G. Becker
  • Economics
    Journal of Political Economy
  • 1973
I present in this paper the skeleton of a theory of marriage. The two basic assumptions are that each person tries to do as well as possible and that the "marriage market" is in equilibrium. With the