Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points

@article{Harsanyi1973GamesWR,
  title={Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points},
  author={John C. Harsanyi},
  journal={International Journal of Game Theory},
  year={1973},
  volume={2},
  pages={1-23}
}
  • J. Harsanyi
  • Published 1 December 1973
  • Economics
  • International Journal of Game Theory
Equilibrium points in mixed strategies seem to be unstable, because any player can deviate without penalty from his equilibrium strategy even if he expects all other players to stick to theirs. This paper proposes a model under which most mixed-strategy equilibrium points have full stability. It is argued that for any gameΓ the players' uncertainty about the other players' exact payoffs can be modeled as a disturbed gameΓ*, i.e., as a game with small random fluctuations in the payoffs. Any… 

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