Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III: Part I. The Basic Model&

  title={Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III: Part I. The Basic Model\&},
  author={John C. Harsanyi},
  journal={Manag. Sci.},
  • J. Harsanyi
  • Published 1 December 2004
  • Economics
  • Manag. Sci.
(This article originally appeared in Management Science, November 1967, Volume 14, Number 3, pp. 159-182, published by The Institute of Management Sciences.) The paper develops a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information where the players are uncertain about some important parameters of the game situation, such as the payoff functions, the strategies available to various players, the information other players have about the game, etc. However, each player has a… 
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