• Corpus ID: 59459976

# Games people play: An overview of strategic decision-making theory in conflict situations

@article{Georgiou2015GamesPP,
title={Games people play: An overview of strategic decision-making theory in conflict situations},
author={Harris V. Georgiou},
journal={viXra},
year={2015}
}
Last updated: June 15, 2015 Abstract — In this paper, a gentle introduction to Game Theory is presented in the form of basic concepts and examples. Minimax and Nash's theorem are introduced as the formal definitions for optimal strategies and equilibria in zero-sum and nonzero-sum games. Several elements of cooperative gaming, coalitions, voting ensembles, voting power and collective e ciency are described in brief. Analytical (matrix) and extended (tree-graph) forms of game representation is…
2 Citations

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