Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox

@article{Rosenthal1981GamesOP,
  title={Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox},
  author={Robert W. Rosenthal},
  journal={Journal of Economic Theory},
  year={1981},
  volume={25},
  pages={92-100}
}
  • R. Rosenthal
  • Published 1 August 1981
  • Economics
  • Journal of Economic Theory

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