Games in Dynamic-epistemic Logic

@inproceedings{Benthem2002GamesID,
  title={Games in Dynamic-epistemic Logic},
  author={Johan van Benthem and Wiebe van der Hoek},
  year={2002}
}
We discuss games of both perfect and imperfect information at two levels of structural detail: players’ local actions, and their global powers for determining outcomes of the game. We propose matching logical languages for both. In particular, at the ‘action level’, imperfect information games naturally model a combined ‘dynamic-epistemic language’ – and we find correspondences between special axioms and particular modes of playing games with their information dynamics. At the ‘outcome level… CONTINUE READING
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