Game theory with translucent players

@article{Halpern2013GameTW,
  title={Game theory with translucent players},
  author={Joseph Y. Halpern and Rafael Pass},
  journal={International Journal of Game Theory},
  year={2013},
  volume={47},
  pages={949-976}
}
A traditional assumption in game theory is that players are opaque to one another—if a player changes strategies, then this change in strategies does not affect the choice of other players’ strategies. In many situations this is an unrealistic assumption. We develop a framework for reasoning about games where the players may be translucent to one another; in particular, a player may believe that if she were to change strategies, then the other player would also change strategies. Translucent… 
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Translucent Players: Explaining Cooperative Behavior in Social Dilemmas
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This work proposes a novel approach to explain cooperation, assuming what Halpern and Pass (2013) call "translucent players", and shows that by assuming translucent players, it can recover many of the regularities observed in human behavior in well-studied games such as Prisoner's Dilemma, Traveler’s Dilesmma, Bertrand Competition, and the Public Goods game.
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