• Corpus ID: 15516410

Game Transformations and Game

@inproceedings{EquivalenceBoudewijn1999GameTA,
  title={Game Transformations and Game},
  author={EquivalenceBoudewijn and Paul Bruin},
  year={1999}
}
In 1952, Thompson deened four transformations on extensive games, and proved that they leave the reduced normal form intact (a so{ called \adequacy" theorem). Kohlberg&Mertens, in 1986, proposed two additional game transformations. In this paper, I will state and prove adequacy results for all six transformations in a uniform manner. Then, a number of well{known solution concepts will be surveyed. Finally, I will examine the (in)variance of the solution concepts under the game transformations… 

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