Game Theory and the Politics of Global Warming: The State of Play and beyond

@article{Ward1996GameTA,
  title={Game Theory and the Politics of Global Warming: The State of Play and beyond},
  author={Hugh Ward},
  journal={Political Studies},
  year={1996},
  volume={44},
  pages={850 - 871}
}
  • Hugh Ward
  • Published 1 December 1996
  • Sociology
  • Political Studies
Global climate change is characterized as a collective-action game played by nations through time. The conditions under which conditional cooperation can occur are explored. The model clarifies the bargaining tactics used by nations in the negotiation of the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the reasons why there may be collective action failure. The model also illuminates issues of regime design. 

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