Game-Theoretic Protection Against Networked SIS Epidemics by Human Decision-Makers

@article{Hota2019GameTheoreticPA,
  title={Game-Theoretic Protection Against Networked SIS Epidemics by Human Decision-Makers},
  author={Ashish Ranjan Hota and Shreyas Sundaram},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2019},
  volume={abs/1703.08750}
}

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