Game-Theoretic Analysis of DDoS Attacks Against Bitcoin Mining Pools

@inproceedings{Johnson2014GameTheoreticAO,
  title={Game-Theoretic Analysis of DDoS Attacks Against Bitcoin Mining Pools},
  author={Benjamin Johnson and Aron Laszka and Jens Grossklags and Marie Vasek and Tyler W. Moore},
  booktitle={Financial Cryptography Workshops},
  year={2014}
}
One of the unique features of the digital currency Bitcoin is that new cash is introduced by so-called miners carrying out resource-intensive proof-of-work operations. To increase their chances of obtaining freshly minted bitcoins, miners typically join pools to collaborate on the computations. However, intense competition among mining pools has recently manifested in two ways. Miners may invest in additional computing resources to increase the likelihood of winning the next mining race. But… 
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  • Ittay Eyal
  • Computer Science
    2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
  • 2015
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