# Game Redesign in No-regret Game Playing

@inproceedings{Ma2022GameRI,
author={Yuzhe Ma and Young Wu and Xiaojin Zhu},
booktitle={IJCAI},
year={2022}
}
• Yuzhe Ma
• Published in IJCAI 18 October 2021
• Economics
We study the game redesign problem in which an external designer has the ability to change the payoff function in each round, but incurs a design cost for deviating from the original game. The players apply no-regret learning algorithms to repeatedly play the changed games with limited feedback. The goals of the designer are to (i) incentivize players to take a specific target action profile frequently; (ii) incur small cumulative design cost. We present game redesign algorithms with the…
2 Citations

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