Gains to cooperation drive the evolution of egalitarianism.

  title={Gains to cooperation drive the evolution of egalitarianism.},
  author={Paul L. Hooper and Hillard S. Kaplan and Adrian V. Jaeggi},
  journal={Nature human behaviour},
What conditions favour egalitarianism, that is, muted hierarchies with relatively equal distributions of resources? Here, we combine the hawk-dove and prisoner's dilemma games to model the effects of economic defensibility, costs of competition and gains from cooperation on egalitarianism, operationalized as the absence of hawks. We show that a 'leveller' strategy, which punishes hawkishness in the hawk-dove game with defection in the prisoner's dilemma, can be evolutionarily stable provided… 
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