GROVES' SCHEME ON RESTRICTED DOMAINS

@article{Holmstrom1979GROVESSO,
  title={GROVES' SCHEME ON RESTRICTED DOMAINS},
  author={Bengt Holmstrom},
  journal={Econometrica},
  year={1979},
  volume={47},
  pages={1137-1144}
}
It is proved that Groves’ scheme is unique on restricted domains which are smoothly connected, in particular convex domains. This generalizes earlier uniqueness results by Green and Laffont and Walker. An example shows that uniqueness may be lost if the domain is not smoothly connected. 
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