• Corpus ID: 13871665

GPS Spoofing Countermeasures

@inproceedings{Warner2003GPSSC,
  title={GPS Spoofing Countermeasures},
  author={J. Sterling Warner and Roger G. Johnston},
  year={2003}
}
Civilian Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers are vulnerable to a number of different attacks such as blocking, jamming, and spoofing. The goal of such attacks is either to prevent a position lock (blocking and jamming), or to feed the receiver false information so that it computes an erroneous time or location (spoofing). GPS receivers are generally aware of when blocking or jamming is occurring because they have a loss of signal. Spoofing, however, is a surreptitious attack. Currently… 

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