GENES, LEGITIMACY AND HYPERGAMY: ANOTHER LOOK AT THE ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE

@article{SaintPaul2015GENESLA,
  title={GENES, LEGITIMACY AND HYPERGAMY: ANOTHER LOOK AT THE ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE},
  author={Gilles Saint‐Paul},
  journal={Journal of Demographic Economics},
  year={2015},
  volume={81},
  pages={331 - 377}
}
  • G. Saint‐Paul
  • Published 1 May 2008
  • Economics
  • Journal of Demographic Economics
Abstract: In order to credibly “sell” legitimate children to their spouse, women must forego more attractive mating opportunities. This paper derives the implications of this observation for the pattern of matching in marriage markets, the dynamics of human capital accumulation, and the evolution of the gene pool. A key consequence of the trade-off faced by women is that marriage markets will naturally tend to be hypergamous – that is, a marriage is more likely to be beneficial to both parties… 
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