GAIROSCOPE: Injecting Data from Air-Gapped Computers to Nearby Gyroscopes

@article{Guri2022GAIROSCOPEID,
  title={GAIROSCOPE: Injecting Data from Air-Gapped Computers to Nearby Gyroscopes},
  author={Mordechai Guri},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2022},
  volume={abs/2208.09764}
}
—It is known that malware can leak data from isolated, air-gapped computers to nearby smartphones using ultrasonic waves. However, this covert channel requires access to the smartphone’s microphone, which is highly protected in Android OS and iOS, and might be non-accessible, disabled, or blocked.Inthis paper we present ‘GAIROSCOPE,’ an ultrasonic covert channel that doesn’t require a microphone on the receiving side. Our malware generates ultrasonic tones in the resonance frequencies of the… 

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