Functionalism and Reductionism

  title={Functionalism and Reductionism},
  author={Robert C. Richardson},
  journal={Philosophy of Science},
  pages={533 - 558}
  • R. C. Richardson
  • Published 1 December 1979
  • Psychology, Philosophy
  • Philosophy of Science
It is here argued that functionalist constraints on psychology do not preclude the applicability of classic forms of reduction and, therefore, do not support claims to a principled, or de jure, autonomy of psychology. In Part I, after isolating one minimal restriction any functionalist theory must impose on its categories, it is shown that any functionalism imposing an additional constraint of de facto autonomy must also be committed to a pure functionalist--that is, a computationalist--model… 

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