Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion

  title={Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion},
  author={J. Mathis},
  journal={J. Econ. Theory},
  • J. Mathis
  • Published 2008
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • J. Econ. Theory
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on both players' preferences and information that can be certified for a Sender–Receiver game to possess a separating equilibrium, as well as sufficient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be separating. Accordingly, we generalize Seidmann and Winter's [D.J. Seidmann, E. Winter, Strategic information transmission with verifiable messages, Econometrica 65 (1997) 163–170] results to games with partial provability. 

Topics from this paper

Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
All nonseparating equilibria are characterized, and it is shown that less information might be conveyed in any equilibrium of a verifiable message game than in some equilibrium of the cheap talk game with the same parameters. Expand
A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions
This paper considers a persuasion game between one sender and one receiver. The perfectly informed sender can fully certify any private information that is drawn from a continuum set, and theExpand
Verifiability and neologism-proofness in a Sender-Receiver game
It is shown that if a fully revealing perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) exists when talk is cheap, then one also exists when messages are verifiable, and this is not the case for neologism-proof PBE's. Expand
Persuasion under Second-Order Uncertainty∗
We study a general model of persuasion games. Absent second-order uncertainty about the sender’s knowledge of an uncertain state variable, we provide an algorithm for constructing a truthfulExpand
Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission
This paper provides a constructive method to build fully revealing equilibria, and shows that complicated communication, where far-away types pool together, allows dynamic manipulation of beliefs to enable better information release in the future. Expand
Cheap Talk with Transparent Motives
We study a model of cheap talk with one substantive assumption: The sender’s preferences are state independent. Our main observation is that such a sender gains credibility by degrading self-servingExpand
Communication with Evidence in the Lab
This experiment relies on a graphical representation of sender's incentives in these games, and permits partial disclosure, and is largely consistent with a non-equilibrium model of strategic thinking based on the iterated elimination of obviously dominated strategies. Expand
Information and evidence in bargaining
In a simple bilateral bargaining model with two-sided private information, players may receive signals about the value of the available surplus. The equilibrium of this game when signals areExpand
Lies and consequences
A strategic-communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with partially aligned preferences is studied, finding that the receiver’s stochastic lie-detection ability makes fully revealing equilibria—the best outcome for the receiver—possible, even for small p. Expand
Where does the sender ’ s information come from ? Communication with Endogenous Information Acquisition
This paper revisits the Crawford-Sobel game by allowing the sender to choose her information structure endogenously before communicating with the receiver. Information acquisition here is costly,Expand


Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
All nonseparating equilibria are characterized, and it is shown that less information might be conveyed in any equilibrium of a verifiable message game than in some equilibrium of the cheap talk game with the same parameters. Expand
Strategic Information Revelation
We analyze the problem in which agents have non-public information and are to play an asymmetric information game. The agents may reveal some or all of their information to other agents prior toExpand
Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
IF THE SENDER'S PREFERENCES are monotonic in the Receiver's action, then it is known that the Sender reveals its type in every sequential equilibrium of a Sender-Receiver game with verifiableExpand
Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability
We study sequential message-sending games with an uninformed decision maker and multiple self-interested informed agents in which the ability to prove claims is limited. We give necessary andExpand
Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification
This paper surveys the main models of strategic information transmission. First, we study cheap talk games, i.e., direct communication games in which messages are costless and unverifiable. Then, weExpand
Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty
By explicitly integrating higher order uncertainty into the information structure, this paper shows that a perfectly revealing equilibrium does exist when disclosures are not restrained to intervals of the payoff-relevant state space. Expand
Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
We study (costless) information transmission from a job applicant to an employer who must decide whether to hire him and, if so, which position to give him. We construct equilibrium payoffs requiringExpand
This paper develops a model of strategic communication, in which a better-informed Sender (S) sends a possibly noisy signal to a Receiver (R), who then takes an action that determines the welfare ofExpand
Bargaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge
We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interim research knowledge between two participants in an R&D race for an ultimate, patentable invention. Licence fee schedules that areExpand
The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion
Abstract An arbitrator faces the task of deciding the level of compensation to be received by a plaintiff from a defendant. The arbitrator must rely on the verifiable submissions of the twoExpand