From nihilism to monism

  title={From nihilism to monism},
  author={Jonathan Schaffer},
  journal={Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
  pages={175 - 191}
  • J. Schaffer
  • Published 1 June 2007
  • Philosophy
  • Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Mereological nihilism is the view that all concrete objects are simple. Existence monism is the view that the only concrete object is one big simple: the world. I will argue that nihilism culminates in monism. The nihilist demands the simplest sufficient ontology, and the monist delivers it. Nothing is cheaper and commoner in philosophy than monism; what, unhappily, is still rare, is an attempt to defend it, and critically to establish its assumptions. [Schiller 1897: 62] 


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