From a Logical Point of View

@inproceedings{Martin1953FromAL,
  title={From a Logical Point of View},
  author={Richard Milton Martin and W. V. Quine},
  year={1953}
}
entities from the very beginning rather than only where there is a real purpose in such reference. Hence my wish to keep general terms distinct from abstract singular terms. Even in the theory of validity it happens that the appeal to truth values of statements and extensions of predicates can finally be eliminated. For truth-functional validity can be redefined by the familiar tabular method of computation, and validity in quantification theory can be redefined simply by appeal to the rules of… 
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