From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action

  title={From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action},
  author={Joshua Stuchlik},
Volitionalism is a theory of action motivated by certain shortcomings in the standard causal theory of action. However, volitionalism is vulnerable to the objection that it distorts the phenomenology of embodied agency. Arguments for volitionalism typically proceed by attempting to establish three claims: (1) that whenever an agent acts, she tries or wills to act, (2) that it is possible for volitions to occur even in the absence of bodily movement, and (3) that in cases of successful bodily… 
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