• DOI:10.1093/restud/rdv001
• Corpus ID: 8044548

From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: A Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions

@article{delaCroix2012FromPT,
  title={From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: A Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions},
  author={David de la Croix and Fabio Mariani},
  journal={European Economics: Political Economy \& Public Economics eJournal},
  year={2012}
}

• David de la Croix, F. Mariani
• Published 16 June 2012
• Economics, Sociology
• European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal

Consider an economy populated by males and females, both rich and poor. The society has to choose one of the following marriage institutions: polygyny, strict monogamy, and serial monogamy (divorce and remarriage). After having identified the conditions under which each of these equilibria exists, we show that a rise in the share of rich males can explain a change of regime from polygyny to monogamy. The introduction of serial monogamy follows from a further rise in either the proportion of rich males, or an increase in the proportion of rich females. Strict monogamy is a prerequisite to serial monogamy, as it promotes the upward social mobility of females more than polygyny. We also show that polygyny is compatible with democracy.