From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail

  title={From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail},
  author={Xiaotie Deng and Yotam gafni and Ron Lavi and Tao Lin and Hongyi Ling},
We study competition among contests in a general model that allows for an arbitrary and heterogeneous space of contest design, where the goal of the contest designers is to maximize the contestants' sum of efforts. Our main result shows that optimal contests in the monopolistic setting (i.e., those that maximize the sum of efforts in a model with a single contest) form an equilibrium in the model with competition among contests. Under a very natural assumption these contests are in fact… Expand


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