From Institutional Interaction to Institutional Integration: The National Supervisory Commission and China's New Anti-corruption Model

  title={From Institutional Interaction to Institutional Integration: The National Supervisory Commission and China's New Anti-corruption Model},
  author={Li Li and Peng Wang},
  journal={The China Quarterly},
  pages={967 - 989}
  • L. Li, P. Wang
  • Published 27 May 2019
  • Political Science
  • The China Quarterly
Abstract How does the establishment of the National Supervisory Commission affect China's capacity to curb corruption? Using published materials and fieldwork data, this article addresses this question by comparing the newly established anti-corruption agency with the previous dual-track system. It first examines the previous system by focusing on four dimensions of the interaction between the Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI) and the People's Procuratorate: complementarity… 
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