From Combinatorialism to Primitivism

  title={From Combinatorialism to Primitivism},
  author={Jennifer Wang},
  journal={Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
  pages={535 - 554}
  • Jennifer Wang
  • Published 2013
  • Philosophy
  • Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Modal primitivism is the view that metaphysical modality cannot be reduced to something entirely non-modal. It is often rejected for reasons of ideological simplicity: the fewer primitive notions a theory requires, the better. Reductive theories of modality like Armstrong's combinatorialism are thus thought to hold the ideological high ground. According to combinatorialism, what's possible is reducible to recombinations of objects with fundamental properties and relations. If this reduction… Expand
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  • S. Feferman
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  • The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic
  • 2007
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