From Classical to Epistemic Game Theory

  title={From Classical to Epistemic Game Theory},
  author={Andr{\'e}s Perea},
  • A. Perea
  • Published 21 January 2014
  • Philosophy
  • IGTR
In this paper, we give a historical overview of the transition from classical game theory to epistemic game theory. To that purpose we will discuss how important notions such as reasoning about the opponents, belief hierarchies, common belief, and the concept of common belief in rationality arose, and gradually entered the game theoretic picture, thereby giving birth to the field of epistemic game theory. We will also address the question why it took game theory so long before it finally… 
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