• Corpus ID: 17109840

From Bayesian to Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions

@article{Chen2017FromBT,
  title={From Bayesian to Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions},
  author={Jing Chen and B. Li and Yingkai Li},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2017},
  volume={abs/1702.01416}
}
A strong assumption in Bayesian mechanism design is that the distributions of the players' private types are common knowledge to the designer and the players--the common prior assumption. An important problem that has received a lot of attention in both economics and computer science is to repeatedly weaken this assumption in game theory--the "Wilson's Doctrine". In this work we consider, for the first time in the literature, multi-item auctions where the knowledge about the players' value… 

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