Frequentist statistics as a theory of inductive inference

@article{Mayo2006FrequentistSA,
  title={Frequentist statistics as a theory of inductive inference},
  author={Deborah G. Mayo and D. R. Cox},
  journal={arXiv: Statistics Theory},
  year={2006},
  pages={77-97}
}
  • D. Mayo, D. Cox
  • Published 27 October 2006
  • Philosophy
  • arXiv: Statistics Theory
After some general remarks about the interrelation between philosophical and statistical thinking, the discussion centres largely on significance tests. These are defined as the calculation of $p$-values rather than as formal procedures for ``acceptance'' and ``rejection.'' A number of types of null hypothesis are described and a principle for evidential interpretation set out governing the implications of $p$-values in the specific circumstances of each application, as contrasted with a long… 

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