Frequency of monotonicity failure under Instant Runoff Voting: estimates based on a spatial model of elections

@article{Ornstein2014FrequencyOM,
  title={Frequency of monotonicity failure under Instant Runoff Voting: estimates based on a spatial model of elections},
  author={Joseph T. Ornstein and R. Z. Norman},
  journal={Public Choice},
  year={2014},
  volume={161},
  pages={1-9}
}
It has long been recognized that Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) suffers from a defect known as nonmonotonicity, wherein increasing support for a candidate among a subset of voters may adversely affect that candidate’s election outcome. The expected frequency of this type of behavior, however, remains an open and important question, and limited access to detailed election data makes it difficult to resolve empirically. In this paper, we develop a spatial model of voting behavior to approach the… 
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