Frequency, Probability, and Prediction: Easy Solutions to Cognitive Illusions?

@article{Griffin1999FrequencyPA,
  title={Frequency, Probability, and Prediction: Easy Solutions to Cognitive Illusions?},
  author={Dale W. Griffin and Roger Buehler},
  journal={Cognitive Psychology},
  year={1999},
  volume={38},
  pages={48-78}
}
Many errors in probabilistic judgment have been attributed to people's inability to think in statistical terms when faced with information about a single case. Prior theoretical analyses and empirical results imply that the errors associated with case-specific reasoning may be reduced when people make frequentistic predictions about a set of cases. In studies of three previously identified cognitive biases, we find that frequency-based predictions are different from-but no better than-case… 

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