Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person

@inproceedings{Frankfurt1982FreedomOT,
  title={Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person},
  author={Harry Gordon Frankfurt},
  year={1982}
}
What philosophers have lately come to accept as analysis of the concept of a person is not actually analysis of that concept at all. Strawson, whose usage represents the current standard, identifies the concept of a person as “the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics...are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type.”1 But there are many entities besides persons that have both… Expand
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