Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism : Experiments on folk intuitions

@article{Nahmias2007FreeWM,
  title={Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism : Experiments on folk intuitions},
  author={Eddy A. Nahmias and Donna Coates and Trevor Kvaran},
  journal={Midwest Studies in Philosophy},
  year={2007},
  volume={31},
  pages={214-242}
}
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