Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism : Experiments on folk intuitions

@article{Nahmias2007FreeWM,
  title={Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism : Experiments on folk intuitions},
  author={Eddy A. Nahmias and Donna Coates and Trevor Kvaran},
  journal={Midwest Studies in Philosophy},
  year={2007},
  volume={31},
  pages={214-242}
}
Good Bad % a gr ee FW Neuro 

Figures from this paper

The explanatory component of moral responsibility
In this paper, we do three things. First, we put forth a novel hypothesis about judgments of moral responsibility according to which such judgments are a species of explanatory judgments. Second, w
Minds, Brains and Desert: On the relevance of neuroscience for retributive punishment
Title: Minds, Brains, and Desert: On the Relevance of Neuroscience for Retributive Punishment Author: Alva Stråge Language: English Department: Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science Series:
How does the neuroscience of decision making bear on our understanding of moral responsibility and free will?
  • A. Roskies
  • Medicine, Psychology
    Current Opinion in Neurobiology
  • 2012
TLDR
It is argued that these experiments do little to directly undermine the belief that the authors have free will, but evidence for mechanism and automatic behaviors may cause us to rethink some commonsensical notions of what is required for acting freely.
From Intentions to Neurons: Social and Neural Consequences of Disbelieving in Free Will
The problem of free will is among the most fascinating and disputed questions throughout the history of philosophy and psychology. Traditionally limited to philosophical and theological debate, in
From Moral Intuitions to Free Will Intuitions: A Dual Interacting-Process Model
In this essay, after first briefly reviewing the literature on experimental philosophy and how and why it is important especially for contemporary analytic philosophy, we focus on two earliest
Moral responsibility and free will: A meta-analysis
TLDR
A meta-analysis indicates that beliefs in free will are largely robust to emotional reactions, and that affect influences judgments about determinism's relation to free will and moral responsibility.
Incompatibilism and "Bypassed" Agency
In recent papers, Eddy Nahmias and Dylan Murray have proposed an error theory for intuitions supporting incompatibilism. They suggest that when people take responsibility to be undermined by determ
Explaining the Abstract/Concrete Paradoxes in Moral Psychology: The NBAR Hypothesis
For some reason, participants hold agents more responsible for their actions when a situation is described concretely than when the situation is described abstractly. We present examples of this
Responsibility and the Relevance of Alternative Future Possibilities
In the past decade, philosophical and psychological research on people’s beliefs about free will and responsibility has skyrocketed. For the most part, these vignette-based studies have exclusively
Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions
Abstract Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological
...
1
2
3
4
5
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 47 REFERENCES
Responsibility and Atonement
Preface Introduction PART I: Responsibility: Moral goodness Moral responsibility and weakness of will The relevance of free will Merit and reward Guilt, atonement, and forgiveness Punishment Man's
Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility
Philosophers working in the nascent field of ‘experimental philosophy’ have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data about folk intuitions concerning debates ranging from action
Are the folk agent-causationists?
:  Experimental examination of how the folk conceptualize certain philosophically loaded notions can provide information useful for philosophical theorizing. In this paper, we explore issues raised
Freedom and Resentment
Essai philosophique. - Initialement paru dans les "Proceedings of the British Academy", 48, 1962, puis repris dans un recueil d'articles, "Freedom and resentment - and other essays", en 1974
Folk Intuitions , Slippery Slopes , and Necessary
A number of philosophers have recently become increasingly interested in the potential usefulness of fictitious and illusory beliefs. As a result, a wide variety of fictionalisms and illusionisms
Folk Fears about Freedom and Responsibility: Determinism vs. Reductionism
My initial work, with collaborators Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, and Jason Turner (2005, 2006), on surveying folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility was designed primarily to
Free will and illusion
1. INTRODUCTION PART I: METAPHYSICAL AND ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS 2. THE CORE CONCEPTION 3. WHY NOT COMPATIBILISM? 4. WHY NOT LIBERTARIAN FREE WILL? 5. WHY NOT HARD DETERMINISM? 6. THE FUNDAMENTAL DUALISM
Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions
The dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists must be one of the most persistent and heated deadlocks in Western philosophy. Incompatibilists maintain that people are not fully morally
From neural 'is' to moral 'ought': what are the moral implications of neuroscientific moral psychology?
TLDR
I agree with traditional ethicists that there is a sharp and crucial distinction between the 'is' of science and the 'ought' of ethics, but maintain nonetheless that science, and neuroscience in particular, can have profound ethical implications by providing us with information that will prompt us to re-evaluate the authors' moral values and their conceptions of morality.
Strawsonian Variations : Folk Morality and the Search for a Unified Theory 1
vs. Concrete It is essential to distinguish between different ways of checking to see whether a given principle is in accord with ordinary people’s judgments. One approach would be to present people
...
1
2
3
4
5
...